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Free Wage Labor and The Suffrage 
in Nineteenth Century England 
Von 
Robert J. Steinfeld 
Summary: I. Introduction: Conflicting Historical Narratives; 2. Penal Enforcement 
of Wage Labor Agreements in Nineteenth Century England; 3. The Economics of 
Coercion In Wage Labor; 4. The Importance of An Expanded Suffrage In Ending The 
Use of Penal Pressure In Wage Labor; 5. Conclusion: Free Markets and Free Wage 
Labor? 
1. In t roduc t ion: Conf l ic t ing His tor ica l  Narra t ives: 
Over recent decades the master historical narrative of modem slavery has 
largely been rewritten 1 ). Today, most historians accept the idea that modern 
slavery did not disappear because physical coercion proved unprofitable in 
extracting slave labor services2). They believe that slavery disappeared be­
cause states compelled employers of slave labor to give up the practice, even 
while it continued to generate large profits. Yet while the master historical 
narrative of slavery has been largely rewritten, the same cannot be said about 
the master historical narrative of wage labor. Surprisingly, the latter narra­
tive continues to rely on the traditional notion that Anglo-American waged 
labor over the last few centuries was free labor because employers shunned 
physical coercion as an unprofitable method for extracting labor services. The 
underlying economic logic of the free wage labor narrative is the same logic 
that has been discredited as a basis for understanding the history of modern 
slavery. Yet, while the slavery narrative has been transformed, the traditional 
free wage labor narrative endures. 
1) Time On The Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (1974), by 
Rober t  Foge l  and St a n ley Enge rman  was the book that initiated this reap­
praisal. 
2) See, for example, Ir a Ber l i n, Many Thousands Gone (1998), and Phi l ip 
Morgan, Slave Counterpoint (1998). 
19* 
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The dominant view among historians continues to be that waged labor has 
been free labor in England and America at least since the eighteenth century 
simply because the market, rather than other more direct means of coercion, 
completely satisfied the economic needs of employers. Depending upon one's 
political perspective, market incentives or market pressures are thought to 
have worked perfectly well to supply employers with cheap, efficient wage 
labor. Indeed, bodily compulsion3) is assumed to have been costly and to have 
produced sullen, inefficient workers. The free labor narrative with its underly­
ing assumption about the economic inefficiency of bodily coercion has a long 
history, dating back in its modem form to the eighteenth century'). During the 
last decade of that century, for example, Joseph Townsend wrote that 
Legal constraint is attended with much trouble, violence and noise; creates ill will, 
and never can be productive of good and acceptable service; whereas hunger is not 
only peaceable, silent, unremitting pressure, but, as the most natural motive to industry 
and labor, it calls forth the most powerful exertions; . . .  The slave must be compelled 
to work but the free man should be left to his own judgment and discretion; should be 
protected in the full enjoyment of his own, be it much or little; and punished when he 
invades his neighbor's property5). 
During the same period in which Townsend wrote, Adam Smith offered a 
more positive version of the factors that made free labor more efficient that 
coerced labor. Coercion, he argued, gave workers little incentive to produce 
efficiently. "Whatever work [ a slave does] can be squeezed out of him by 
violence only, and not by any interest of his own"6). By contrast free workers 
have "a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, 
in order that their own proportion may be so"7). Even today such views carry 
great weight. Recently, for example, one survey of economic literature ob­
served that "[e]lementary economic reasoning suggests that in the long run 
3) By bodily compulsion, I mean compulsion that involves physical violence, bodi­
ly confinement, loss of bodily freedom of movement, or threats of such consequences. 
I contrast bodily compulsion, for the purpose of the argument here, to economic or 
pecuniary compulsion that involves deprivation of property or income. For a fuller 
discussion of this issue, see R ober t  S te infe ld ,  Coercion, Contract and Free Labor 
(2001), 1-29, 308-311. 
4) A. W. Coats ,  "Changing Attitudes to Labour in the Mid-Eighteenth Century," 
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XI ( 1958). 
5) Jos e p h  Townsend ,  "A Dissertation on the Poor Laws" quoted in Da v id  
Br ion Dav i s ,  The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (1975), 
358-59. 
6) Ada m  Smith ,  Wealth of Nations (Edwn Cannan, ed., 1976), Book III, Ch. II, 
411-412. 
7) Ibid., p. 413. 
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the institution of slavery is unviable economically ... As a slave receives only 
a fraction of his marginal product, enough to cover productive consumption, 
he has fewer incentives to work hard than ifhe were to internalize his entire 
marginal product as free workers do"8). 
Modem historians have produced additional arguments showing that un­
coerced labor has proved to be economically superior to coerced labor. A 
number of American historians, for example, have argued that American em­
ployers spontaneously turned away from indentured servitude and toward 
free wage labor during the late eighteenth century because they found inden­
tured labor more costly than free labor, since it committed them to support 
their indentured workers during increasingly common economic downtums9). 
Another historian has argued that bound labor was abolished in the Scottish 
coal mines during the last quarter of the eighteenth century because powerful 
mine owners wished to gain unimpeded access to the limited pool of skilled 
Scottish coal miners, and agitated for the abolition of bound labor in order 
to do so 10). 
The dominance of this kind of reasoning has left historians with little mo­
tive to look for examples of the use of bodily coercion in the history of wage 
labor. And by and large historians have not found what they did not go looking 
for. The historical picture of wage labor today takes for granted, in the main, 
that wage work has not traditionally been subject to direct forms of coercion, 
indeed it is almost considered a contradiction in terms to think that it could 
have been. 
What is strange about the enduring power of this wage labor narrative 
is that historians of slavery no longer accept the proposition, by and large, 
that bodily coercion cannot produce highly productive labor. On the contrary, 
historians of modem slavery are now widely agreed that bodily coercion, or 
bodily coercion combined with incentives, did produce labor that was even 
more productive than wage labor in certain settings, and in other settings, ur­
ban artisanal work for example, at least as productive as waged labor. 
To be sure, over the last 25 years there has been a general reassessment 
of the efficacy of coercion in labor relations, and historians have discovered 
8) Thra inn  Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990), 205. 
9) Sharon Sal inger, 'To Serve Well and Faithfully,' Labor and Indentured Ser­
vants in Pennsylvania, 1682-1800(1987), 149-52; Gar y  Nash, The Urban Crucible 
(1979), 320. 
10) C hristopher  What l ey, "'The Fettering Bonds of  Brotherhood': Combina­
tion and Labour Relations in the Scottish Coal-Mining Industry, c. 1690-1775", Social 
History 12 (May, 1987). 
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much more coerced labor in the world than they had previously thought ex­
isted. That bodily coercion cannot produce highly productive, profitable la­
bor is no longer accepted as a universal rule of labor relations. But historians 
have been reluctant to embrace the opposite proposition, that bodily coercion 
might have been economically advantageous for employers in a wide variety 
of labor market settings. Instead, they have strained to define precisely those 
market conditions under which bodily coercion could prove economically ad­
vantageous, and to distinguish them from the more typical market conditions 
under which employers would not have found bodily coercion beneficial''). 
This is a complicated story, but in general a tacit consensus has emerged 
that in places in which labor was relatively abundant, as in the fully developed 
wage labor markets of the metropolitan core of England and the United States, 
bodily coercion was economically unnecessary, indeed even counterproduc­
tive. As a result coerced labor has come to be viewed mainly as a phenom­
enon of the global periphery (where labor markets were thin), and of certain 
forms of agricultural production (in which working conditions were particu­
larly onerous). For all the progress that has been made in understanding how 
widely coerced labor was used, the view that bodily coercion can be of great 
benefit in extracting labor services has not generally been seen to apply to the 
case of wage labor in the English and American metropolitan core. 
2. Penal  Enforcement  of Wage Labor  Agreements  in  Nine­
teenth Cen tu ry  Eng land: 
The narrative of free wage labor endures, by and large, despite the fact that 
as long ago as 1954 Daphne Simon demonstrated unequivocally that penal 
pressure was, in fact, used quite widely against wage workers in nineteenth 
England 12). One would have thought the rediscovery that under the English 
Master and Servant acts wage workers had regularly been imprisoned at hard 
labor for violating their work agreements, in the nation that stood at the fore­
front of free market industrialization, might have led to a rethinking of the 
master historical narrative of wage labor 13). But it did not. And one impor­
tant reason it did not was that Simon herself interpreted the English practice 
11
) For one of the best attempts to identify these different labor market conditions 
see Evsey  Domar, "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis", Journal of 
Economic History 30 (March, 1970). 
12) Daphne Simon, "Master and Servant", in Democracy and the Labour Move­
ment: Essays in Honour of Dona Torr (John Sav i  lie , ed., 1954). 
13) 4 Geo. IV, c. 34 (1823). Most skilled English workers were not employees at 
will, but served under agreements that bound them for shorter or longer terms of ser­
vice or called for them to give several weeks or a month's notice before leaving. 
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through the lens of a Marxist version of the free wage labor narrative. She 
subscribed to the view that modem capitalism relied on the dull compulsion 
of economic relations to extract labor services. Other forms of coercion like 
the penal coercion authorized by the Master and Servant acts were relics of a 
feudal stage of development, and doomed to extinction because they no lon­
ger served the economic interests of modem capitalist employers. She thought 
that the Master and Servant acts might have been of some help to small, back­
ward employers, but as the economy modernized the acts became less and less 
useful. As soon as organized labor began to protest, she argued, the employ­
ing classes simply abandoned the acts, putting up only symbolic resistance. 
Thus Simon, who was the first to rediscover how extensively penal pressure 
had been used in English wage labor as late as 1875, dismissed its economic 
importance, relegating it to a marginal role in the history of wage labor. 
A second important reason her discovery had practically no impact on the 
larger historical narrative of wage labor was that no one seemed able to say 
precisely what economic benefits employers derived by using penal pres­
sures against wage workers. And without such an explanation, there was no 
basis for calling into question the economic logic upon which the free labor 
narrative rested: wage labor has been free labor simply because employers 
found bodily coercion unprofitable. Yet the stubborn fact remained that in 
the years between 1857 and 1875 (years for which there are comprehensive 
statistics available) English employers frequently used penal pressure against 
their wage workers. About 10,000 English workers each year on average were 
prosecuted for misbehavior at work, or for leaving work before their agree­
ment entitled them to 14). Until 1867, about 1,500 workers, on average, were 
imprisoned each year, but a large percentage of the 10,000 or so workers who 
were prosecuted each year, but not imprisoned, were forced back to work 
under the threat of imprisonment15). 
Recently, historians have begun to devote more attention to the Master and 
Servant acts. A number of new studies of the acts have now been published, 
and a consensus has emerged that Simon's view that the acts were economi­
cally anachronistic is simply wrong'6). But none of these studies has managed 
14) Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1857-1875, 19 vols. (1858-1876) and 
Simon,  "Master and Servant," op. cit. n. 12. 
15) "In one small sample from Preston and surrounding towns in Lancashire during 
1865-66, I've found that 54% of those prosecuted were ordered back to work under 
threat of imprisonment, while only 17% of those prosecuted were actually given a 
prison term" (Marc W. Steinberg, unpublished manuscript in author's possession). 
16) See, for example, Douglas Hay, "Penal Sanctions, Masters and Servants" (Un-
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to identify precisely what economic benefits employers derived by using pe­
nal pressure against wage workers. As a result, even though the widespread 
use of penal pressure in English wage labor is now well documented, there 
has been no direct challenge to the economic logic that underlies the larger 
free wage labor narrative. 
As a result historians today subscribe to two master historical narratives 
of labor based on contradictory views about the economic efficacy of bodily 
coercion. The slavery narrative is based on the idea that bodily coercion of 
labor was of great economic benefit to employers, and that they relinquished 
it only when the state, for political and moral reasons, compelled them to do 
so. The other narrative, the wage labor narrative, holds just the opposite, that 
bodily coercion of labor produced sullen, inefficient workers, and employers 
of waged labor avoided using it. According to this narrative, free wage labor 
was the spontaneous result of the operation of employer interests in free mar­
kets, rather than a product of political intervention. 
But by now it is clear that the traditional wage labor narrative does not 
fit the facts very well. In particular, it does not account for what we know 
about the widespread use of penal pressure in nineteenth century English 
wage labor. Nevertheless, if this long established narrative is to be definitive­
ly overturned, it is necessary to show that its economic rationale is flawed. 
It is necessary to demonstrate that employers of waged labor derived real 
economic benefits by using penal pressure in a variety of market settings. If 
this can be shown, then factors other than the economic interests of employ­
ers must have been responsible for the ultimate disappearance of this type 
of coercive power over wage labor. Such a demonstration opens up the pos­
sibility, moreover, that, as in the case of slavery, state intervention, rather 
than market forces, led to the elimination of an otherwise profitable form of 
coercive power. 
3. The  Economics  of  Coerc ion  I n  Wage  Labor: 
Transaction costs analysis, developed in recent decades by neo-institutional 
economists, helps to identify precisely what economic benefits employers of 
waged labor derived from the use of penal pressure. This analysis must begin 
with wages. Institutional economists have shown that neither hourly wages 
nor piece-work wages completely eliminates the need for supervision (and 
hence supervision costs) in waged labor. Employers of waged labor face su-
published manuscript, 1990); and Hay, "Masters, Servants, Justices and Judges" (Un­
published manuscript,1988); D. C. Woods,  "The Operation of the Master and Ser­
vants Act in the Black Country, 1858-1875," Midland History 7 (1982). 
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pervision problems that are not completely unlike those faced by slave own­
ers. "Owners had the choice," Yoram Barze! writes, "between supervising 
their slaves' output [ as to quantity and quality], which is comparable to what 
employers have to do when the free workers they employ work by the piece, 
and supervising their effort, which is comparable to what employers have to 
do when they employ free workers by the hour" 17). Because the interests of 
waged workers cannot be perfectly aligned with the interests of their employ­
ers through the payment of wages, employers inevitably incur supervision 
costs in the course of production. 
These costs are of two kinds, costs of supervision to enforce effort or guar­
antee quality, and residual costs of reduced output or low quality that cannot 
be eliminated because the added costs of supervision necessary to eliminate 
them will be higher than the improvement in quality and increase in produc­
tion such increased supervision can be expected to generate. Threats of dis­
missal can certainly raise the costs of shirking to workers, and may help to 
control supervision costs, but dismissal is not always a good option for em­
ployers. Where waged labor is skilled and labor markets are tight, the threat 
of dismissal loses much of its power. 
Unemployment among skilled workers in England has been estimated to 
have been below 4% in 11 of the 15 years between 1860 and 1875 18). But 
where sloppiness or loafing at work can lead to a prison term at hard labor, 
through the use of an inexpensive, summary legal process, the prospect of in­
carceration at hard labor must certainly raise the expected cost of shirking to 
workers, at little additional cost to employers, yielding both less shirking and 
lower supervision costs. At a time when supervision strategies in many indus­
tries were not well developed, these advantages were probably substantial. 
There are numerous examples in the records of English employers prose­
cuting workers because they failed to work as well or as hard as was expected. 
"George Heywood of West Bromwich", for example, 
was a bundler at the furnace of an iron works with both puddlers and millmen depen­
dent upon him. Because he left his labour for a few hours, "the work was very much 
in arrears and other men were idle." He was given the option of paying £5 damages 
or having two months in prison and remarked that "he would have to have the two 
months" 19). 
17) Yoram Barze I, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (1989), 80. 
18) Will iam Bever idge, Full Employment in a Free Society, 2d ed. (London 
1960), Appendix A; see also A. C. P igou, Industrial Fluctuations, 2d ed. (London 
1929), Appendix, Table I. 
19) D. C. Woods, "The Operation of the Master and Servants Act in the Black 
Country," 105. 
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A puddler working the night shift at an iron works in Walsall, Staffordshire 
left iron in the furnace overnight where it spoiled, causing his employer sub­
stantial damage. He was given a twenty-one day sentence2°). George Odger, a 
bootmaker in the putting out system testified in the 1860s that 
Any decent man ... is apt to be terrified with the thought that his employer would feel 
disposed to have him before a magistrate for [a] breach of contract ... I think it would 
be about two months ago ... I went over the time [for returning finished work], the 
first time I ever did in my life; [my employer] called at my house when I was out and 
threatened that ifhe had not the work in a given time he would proceed against me in 
the ordinary way for breach of contract. I went home and then went to the workshop 
and worked nearly all night to get the work to him the next day, which embarrassed 
me a good deal because I had been at work all the day before. I do not know whether 
he would have carried out his threat or not, but I was within his clutches if I did not 
make the boots21). 
A summary criminal penalty for breaches of labor agreements also helped 
employers to lower other types of costs. Turnover costs are the costs an em­
ployer must bear when a worker leaves his job. One of the most significant 
elements of turnover costs is often the cost oflost output between the depar­
ture of a worker and his subsequent replacement. But an employer must also 
frequently bear search costs and training costs. Turnover is far from costless 
in the case of skilled labor, even in thick labor markets, and may be especially 
high when labor markets are tight. In England in the years between 1857 and 
1875, employers prosecuted workers under the Master and Servant acts much 
more frequently when unemployment was low than when it was high, and as 
noted, unemployment was often very low in this period22). There is abundant 
evidence from the period that employers commonly used contracts of a fort­
night or a month to regulate turnover, to prevent workers from leaving sud­
denly, possibly disrupting production, and to give themselves time to locate 
replacement workers. If a worker was not free to leave immediately but was 
required to give two weeks' or a month's notice, by the time he was free to 
leave other offers of employment might no longer remain open and in those 
cases turnover costs might be avoided altogether. 
In addition, a well timed policy of signing skilled workers to criminally 
enforceable labor contracts of a year or several years, which employers com­
monly did during this period, might have helped to lower labor costs in yet 
20) Ibid. 
21) Testimony of George Odger before the "Select Committee on Master and Ser­
vant" (1866), XIII, Q. 1813. 
22) Robert S te infeld, Coercion, Contract and Free Laborin the Nineteenth Cen­
tury (2001), 75-77. 
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another way, by slowing the rate of wage increases during periods of low 
unemployment. Workers bound by a criminally enforceable contract were 
obligated to work for the wages they had originally agreed upon, even if in a 
tight labor market wages subsequently rose. Unemployment was extremely 
low in 1864 and 1865, for example, and employers in the pottery trade began 
to try to impose annual contracts on their workmen. One potter complained 
that "seeing that trade is now in a prosperous state, that long period of agree­
ment takes from the workman the power of raising the price of his labour"23). 
In June, 1865 a worker named Clarke signed a two year contract to work for 
a cutlery manufacturer. In November, Clarke left and Unwin, his employer, 
prosecuted him for contract breach. Clarke answered that "he had applied to 
[his employer] to make an advance in his wages in the same manner that the 
large majority of the cutlery manufacturers in Sheffield had recently done 
to their hired workmen, which the appellants had refused to do, and in con­
sequence thereof he had felt himself justified in refusing to work for them 
at the low rate ofwages"24). In 1865 skilled unemployment hovered around 
2%25). The magistrates warned Clarke that the contract prices could not be 
raised except by mutual consent, that Unwin was unwilling to agree to an in­
crease, and that Clarke must return to work at the old prices or be imprisoned. 
Clarke answered that he would rather be sent to prison than go back to work 
at the original prices. The justices obliged, sentencing Clarke to 21 days at 
hard labor. When he was released, he returned to Unwin to retrieve his tools, 
but Unwin insisted that Clarke was still obligated to work out his contract at 
the original prices. Clarke refused and was prosecuted again. The court ruled 
that he could be imprisoned a second time, and at this point Clarke had had 
enough, deciding to return to work on the original terms26). 
It is true that there were disadvantages as well as advantages for employ­
ers in this system of criminally enforceable labor contracts. In tight labor 
markets the system might make it more difficult for an employer to obtain 
skilled labor. In slack labor markets he might have to worry about contrac­
tual obligations he had undertaken in more prosperous times. But taken all 
together employers derived considerable economic benefits from their power 
23) "Select Committee on Master and Servant" ( 1866) XIII, Q. 1410. 
24) Unwin v. Clarke, l L.R. 417 (1866), 418. 
25) For estimates of skilled unemployment rates, see Bever idge, Full Employ­
ment in a Free Society, Appendix A; and Pigou,  Industrial Fluctuations, Appendix, 
Table I. 
26) Unwin v. Clarke, 1 L.R. 417 ( 1866), 418-19; and testimony of William Dron­
field before the "Select Committee on Master and Servant" (1866), XIII: Q. 864. 
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criminally to enforce the performance oflabor agreements of various lengths 
under which almost all skilled English workers were employed. 
The economic benefits of penal coercion explain why employers continued 
to prosecute workers under the Master and Servant acts with great enthusiasm 
up until almost the moment the acts were repealed. In 1871 unemployment 
among skilled workers fell to 1.6%, in 1872 to .9%. In 1873 it rose slightly to 
1.2% and in 1874 to 1. 7%27). In 1870 employers prosecuted 8,670 workers in 
England and Wales for offences under the Master and Servant acts. In 1871, 
however, as unemployment plunged, they prosecuted 10,810 workers, and in 
1872 prosecutions soared to 17,082 and then came down slightly in 1873 to 
16,230. But in 1875, the very year the Master and Servant acts were repealed, 
prosecutions were still at a level of 14,35328). 
The economic benefits employers derived from using penal pressure also 
help to explain why ruling elites did not give up the Master and Servant Acts 
without a very long struggle. It took organized British labor almost 15 years of 
campaigning before Parliament finally repealed the acts, and over this period 
the system of penal coercion continued to be defended tenaciously. Conces­
sions were made only grudgingly, and a great deal of effort was expended to 
preserve the core practices of the old system for as long as possible29). English 
27) Bever idge  and P igou, op. cit. 
28) Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1857-1875, 19 vols. (1858-1876). These 
are large numbers but they represent only a small percentage of the laboring popula­
tion as a whole, and the question inevitably arises whether the acts were actually ef­
fective in accomplishing their goals. We probably can never have a definitive answer 
for this question, because on the one hand it is impossible to determine how often 
workers violated labor agreements and were not prosecuted, and on the other how 
often workers thought about but did not violate labor agreements because they feared 
prosecution. These everyday events would not have shown up in prosecution statistics. 
For an extended discussion of this problem, see Ste infe ld,  Coercion, Contract and 
Free Labor, 72-82. But we do have some evidence and it is possible to make some 
guesses about the effectiveness of the acts. One Justice of the Peace, who was also an 
employer, when asked whether he had resorted to the acts very often answered "No, 
not often ... The moral effect of having the power is often sufficient." Testimony befor 
the Select Committee on Master and Servant ( 1866), XIII,Q.1441. We also know that 
local newspapers throughout the country reported Master and Servant prosecutions in 
their daily or weekly crime columns so that local workmen would have been put on 
notice as to who and how many local workers were being made examples of. At the 
very least, the acts loomed large enough in the lives of working people to induce them 
to undertake an extended political campaign to have them reformed. 
29) For an extended discussion of these parliamentary battles, see S t e infeld ,  
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor, Ch. 6. 
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employers clearly believed that they profited from the use of penal pressure in 
wage labor, used such pressure frequently in their dealings with wage work­
ers, and resisted efforts to deprive them of the power. The ways in which penal 
pressure helped to lower supervision and turnover costs, and keep wages in 
check during periods when labor markets was tight, explain why employers 
would not have relinquished this power without a struggle. A clear economic 
logic existed for the retention of penal pressure in wage labor long after the 
advent of industrial capitalism. 
In the traditional narrative of free wage labor, employer interests explain 
the supposed absence of bodily coercion in wage labor. But it is now clear 
not only that English employers continued to utilize penal pressure during 
industrialization, but that they did so precisely because they found it profit­
able. In fact, English employers did not abandon penal pressure as a natural 
consequence of the introduction of freer markets in the nineteenth century. 
They were compelled to relinquish it by a political act of the state. In 1875, 
Parliament repealed the Master and Servant acts, stripping employers of the 
power to use penal pressure. But employers continued to use penal pressure 
against wage workers up until the very moment the acts expired. 
4. The  Impor tance  of  An Expanded  Suffr age  In End ing  
The Use of  Pena l  P re s su re  In Wage Labor: 
It is necessary at this point in the argument to address the question of cau­
sation. How was it possible for such a fundamental change in the legal rules 
governing wage labor to have been adopted over the objections and in oppo­
sition to the economic interests of employers? The answer is a complicated 
one, but it is to be found in the realm of political struggle. 
In 1867 Parliament passed the Second Reform Act, which greatly expanded 
the British suffrage. In the United Kingdom as a whole the number of people 
enfranchised nearly doubled, from about 1.3 million to about 2.4 million30). 
In many towns the new suffrage gave artisans and laborers a majority of the 
vote3 '). 
Whatever meaning is attached to the phrase 'working-class', the potential work­
ing-class electorate in English and Welsh boroughs in the period immediately after 
1867 was probably about.five times the size of the working-class electorate in these 
boroughs before, and over a half their total electorate32). 
30) F. B .  Smith ,  The Making of the Second Reform Bill (1966), 236. 
31) R. K. Webb, Modern England (New York, 1970), 326; Smith, Second Re­
form Bill, 225. 
32) Maurice Cowl ing, 1867, Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing 
of the Second Reform Bill (1967), 46. 
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The expanded suffrage played a critical role in the repeal of the Master and 
Servant Acts in 1875, and with them, in the elimination of the power of em­
ployers to utilize penal pressure against wage workers. But before discussing 
the role an expanded suffrage played in producing this change in the basic 
terms of waged labor, it is necessary to say something about why ruling elites 
would have expanded the suffrage in the first place. 
The best modem authorities reject the Whig interpretation of the passage 
of suffrage reform. Neither free market industrialization nor liberal ideas led 
inevitably to an expanded electorate. 
[Whig historians] see industrial change on the one hand and political change on the 
other, and assume a simple, one-way relationship between them. They by-pass, ignore 
or explain away both the hostility to change and the power to resist it which analysis 
of society at large suggests might be found, not just on one side of the House of Com­
mons but in most parts of both. 
They assume, moreover, a straight progression from the reforms of the 1830s to 
the reforms of the 1870s, neglecting the recession in progressive feeling ... The death 
of Chartism, the mid-Victorian boom and the hints given, alongside a militant trade 
unionism, ofa contented, loyal and royalist working class in some of the larger cities, 
produced a sense of political stability and distrust of Radical motion which impreg­
nated the social attitude of a great part of the House of Commons. If the Reform bill 
of 1867 symbolized the beginning of a period of rapid political change, it did so in a 
parliament which not only thought of itself as the ruling assembly of a highly stable 
society but was also in strong reaction against any suggestion that it should be oth­
erwise33). 
During the 1850s and early 1860s a number of attempts to pass suffrage 
reform had failed to make any headway in Parliament. Indeed, just a year 
earlier, in 1866, a much less radical suffrage reform bill, brought to the floor 
by Gladstone and the Liberal Party, went down to defeat in Parliament34). 
Ultimately, what led to electoral reform in 1867 was a combination of fac­
tors, the most important of which seem to have been the widespread desire 
among ruling elites to reach a limited political settlement with the increas­
ingly well organized and restive working classes, and a political competition 
between Gladstone and Disraeli and the Liberal and Conservative Parties for 
electoral advantage in the near term future35). The Reform Bill of 1867 was 
brought forward and passed by a Conservative government. While it cannot 
be said that the working classes actually forced reform upon Parliament, it 
is nevertheless the case that as a result of the defeat of the Liberal suffrage 
reform bill in 1866, trade unionists and middle class radicals launched and 
33) Ibid., 1-2. 
34) Smith , Second Reform Bill, llO. 
35) Ibid., 229. 
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sustained an out of doors agitation for suffrage reform that lasted nearly a 
year until "the borough suffrage provisions of the [original] Conservative Bill 
were transformed and safe"36). During this long period mass demonstrations 
were held in nearly every major English city sometimes drawing as many as 
150,000 people37). 
The expansion of voting rights played a critical role in the parliamentary 
deliberations that led to the elimination of penal coercion in English wage 
labor. It is possible to assess the impact of the expansion of the suffrage by 
comparing the very different results achieved by two different attempts to 
reform the Master and Servant acts that were undertaken within a few years 
of each other, one before suffrage reform, the second after. 
In the early 1860s trade unionists launched a campaign to reform the Mas­
ter and Servant acts. In 1867, almost at the same time that the suffrage Reform 
Bill was making its way through Parliament, Parliament was also considering 
reforms of the Master and Servant acts. In August of that year Parliament did 
pass a Master and Servant reform act. But this first reform act was passed by 
a Parliament that had been elected under the old, unreformed suffrage, and 
it failed to free working people from the penal pressures to which they had 
long been subject. 
Lord Elcho, a conservative Whig, introduced the bill that ultimately be­
came the first Master and Servant reform act. In 1866 Elcho had voted against 
Gladstone's suffrage reform bill because he thought that it did not go far 
enough to secure a durable political settlement with the working classes, one 
that would guarantee social and economic peace. Thinking that the Conser­
vatives would reward him for his role in Gladstone's defeat, he pressed the 
new Conservative government in 1867 to bring forward a reform bill for the 
Master and Servant acts. But the government refused and Elcho, thinking 
that reform of these acts was essential if social peace was to be maintained, 
introduced his own member's bill. 
The previous session Elcho had chaired a parliamentary committee charged 
with studying the issue of the Master and Servant acts. He had been chosen 
in part because of his long relationship with trade unionists. An old fashioned 
paternalist, he hoped to introduce just enough reform to stabilize old hierar­
chies. The trade union agitation of the previous years had convinced him that 
it was essential to reform the Master and Servant acts, and his bill went some 
distance toward meeting the complaints of organized labor. 
36) Ibid. 
37) Ibid., 139-140. 
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Their chief complaint was that criminal compulsion violated the liberal 
principle of equal treatment under law. Employers were not subject to crimi­
nal penalties under the Master and Servants acts for breaches of labor agree­
ments on their side, only workers were subject to such sanctions. Moreover, 
trade unionists contended, penal sanctions to enforce private agreements rep­
resented a total anomaly in contract law. Breach of contract normally only 
gave rise to a civil action for damages. Hence, the Master and Servant acts 
represented an intolerable example of class legislation. 
Elcho's bill attempted to address several of these objections by making pro­
ceedings under the Master and Servant law as nearly civil in nature as seemed 
politically possible under the circumstances. In an apparent effort to preserve 
the civil nature of proceedings under a new Master and Servant act, Elcho's 
bill established an entirely separate procedure for criminal prosecutions and 
indicated that such prosecutions should only be based on acts that were al­
ready criminal under the general criminal law. Nevertheless, from a modern 
perspective, Elcho's bill was far from ideal. It continued to give employers 
the power to seek specific performance oflabor agreements (a civil remedy), 
and it by no means entirely abolished the possibility of criminal prosecution 
for contract breach. 
Nevertheless, when the Elcho bill was introduced into Parliament, it ran 
into stiff resistance. Most of the members who spoke thought that reform of 
Master and Servant law was necessary but that Elcho's bill went too far. Mr. 
Alderman Salomons, for example, said that 
he must express his approval of the Bill. It was founded on reciprocity of principle 
between master and servant. By the present law, the master was responsible civilly-the 
servant criminally. [Nevertheless][i]n all cases where, by the Act of the servant, any 
injury was inflicted upon the master which could not be compensated by fine, an op­
tion of imprisonment ... ought still to be left38). 
A smaller group in parliament spoke against even the principle of reform. 
Mr. Liddell said that he 
could not agree that the House would do well to adopt the whole principle of the pres­
ent Bill. That principle was the abandonment of the punitive process against the work­
men and the doing away with the deterrent effect of the present law39). 
Mr. Jackson added, 
Was a man, having charge of an engine at a pit's mouth, who got drunk and ran away 
to be dealt with merely as a debtor, though he might leave 400 or 500 fellow workmen 
below in enforced idleness and in cruel uncertainty for six or seven hours? It was the 
38) Debate over Lord Elcho's bill, June 4, 1867 Hansard  's Par!. Debates (1867), 
CLXXXVII, col. 1607. 
39) Ibid., col. 1606. 
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knowledge that under the existing law he would be dealt with very differently which 
kept such a man from getting drunk and running away4°). 
The weight of opinion in Parliament seems to have been that the principle 
that masters and men stood on a plane of equality should be conceded, but that 
the details of any new legislation must preserve as much of the old penal system 
as possible. Lord Elcho 's bill was heavily amended in the course of Parliamen­
tary deliberations. When it emerged from committee and was enacted into law 
as the 1867 Master and Servant reform act, the new act retained much more 
of the old penal law than had Lord Elcho's original bill. Employers could still 
seek immediate imprisonment for "aggravated" breaches of contract, and for 
"ordinary" breaches of contract, employers could now seek an order requiring 
a worker to return to work to perform his agreement. Given that employers had 
traditionally used the Master and Servant acts to force workers back to work 
more often than to imprison them, this was not a large concession41 ). 
Just eight years later, in 1875, a Conservative government introduced a new 
bill to reform Master and Servant law, and in a Parliament elected under the 
expanded suffrage, the bill received an entirely different reception than had 
Lord Elcho's bill in 1867. Following suffrage reform, labor had begun to take 
a more active role in electoral politics. For a number ofreasons trade unionists 
had grown deeply disaffected with the Liberal government by the time the gen­
eral election of 1874 was called. During the election campaign Conservative 
candidates played to this antipathy in an effort to win over newly enfranchised 
workers42). The results of the election of 1874 were somewhat of a surprise, the 
Conservatives won by a wide margin, and one factor in their victory seems to 
have been the active hostility of organized labor toward the Liberal Party43). 
It was to redeem electoral pledges to labor that the Conservative government 
introduced its bill to further reform Master and Servant law in 1875. 
The Conservative bill was similar in its terms to the bill Lord Elcho had 
originally introduced in 1867 and which for all its limitations had been re­
jected by Parliament as too radical. In 1875, however, the dominant reac­
tion in Parliament was just the opposite, the government bill failed to go far 
enough. Apparently, once the Conservative government made the decision 
to place reform on the agenda, it set in motion a process that carried the bill 
40) Ibid., col. 1611. 
41 ) See note 15. Note 15 reports prosecutions that took place before the 1867 Master 
and Servant reform act was passed. 
42) Sidn e y  and Be atr ice  Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London 
1920), 287. 
43) Ibid., 286, and Rober t  BI ake, Disraeli (New York 1967), 536 . 
20 Zeitschrift fllr Rechtsgeschichte. CXXIII. Germ. Abt. 
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further and further along in the direction of totally abolishing penal sanctions 
for labor contract breaches. 
Liberal members competed with Conservative members to outdo one an­
other in currying favor with newly enfranchised working class voters. The 
Liberal member Robert Lowe, who in 1866 had played a large role in the 
defeat of Gladstone's bill to reform the suffrage, now objected that the gov­
ernment bill unjustifiably preserved a number of penal features of the old law. 
Lord Montagu joined Lowe in raising these objections. If an act is a crime, 
they argued, it should be a crime whether or not the person is under contract, 
and regardless of his status in life. Criminal law should impose broad legal 
duties. Making breach of a labor contract an element of a crime smacked of 
class legislation, singling workers out for degrading treatment just as in the 
past. Lord Montagu observed that 
to break a civil contract was a civil act, and we had no right to inquire into inten­
tion. In the case of a minute contract [employment at will], a man at the pumping 
engine of a mine might walk away without notice, immense damage might be done to 
property, and yet the act would not be a criminal one. But if there was a contract for 
a week, the man who should do the same act would commit a crime ... [If an act is a 
crime it should be a crime regardless of whether the person is serving under a labor 
contract ]44). 
In the course of Parliamentary deliberations the government bill was heav­
ily amended pushing the resulting legislation further and further in the direc­
tion of totally eliminating the penal aspects of the old Master and Servant law. 
The Employers and Workmen Act of 1875 profoundly changed the terms of 
English waged labor, abolishing, for all practical purposes, the power of em­
ployers to use penal pressure to enforce labor agreements. 
A widened suffrage, of course, was not the only factor in the passage of the 
1875 act. The state of trade union organization, and labor's increasingly active 
participation in electoral politics also played roles. In addition, certain mem­
bers of parliament had become increasingly concerned that workers would 
refuse to enter into any labor agreement other than employment at will unless 
the Master and Servant law was changed. Nevertheless, an expanded suffrage 
was the critical factor in this alteration of basic ground rules in English wage 
labor, ground rules that henceforth prohibited, for all intents and purposes, 
the use of penal pressure in wage labor. 
5. Conclusion: Fre e  Markets  and Fre e  Wage Labor? 
This change in ground rules was the result of almost 15 years of political 
struggle by organized labor, a struggle that met with great resistance until 
44) Hans ard's Par!. Debates (1875), CCXXV: col. 656 (June 28, 1875). 
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almost the last moment. English ruling elites did not spontaneously abandon 
penal pressure because it was proving unprofitable. In 1875 employers pro­
secuted 14,353 workers for various offences under the old Master and Servant 
law just as the new law was about to take effect45). Employers continued to 
find penal pressure of great economic benefit until the very last, until Parlia­
ment compelled them to give it up as a result of the outcome of a complicated 
series of political struggles. The logic of the rejection of penal coercion in 
English wage labor was a political not an economic logic. And it was unequi­
vocally not the spontaneous result of the introduction of free markets. 
Much more research needs to be done to understand the terms and operation 
of other legal regimes that governed waged labor in other countries during 
the nineteenth century, but if it turns out that the English case was not atypic­
al in making penal pressure available to employers, it may be that the logic 
underlying the history of waged labor will also tum out to be not so different 
from the logic underlying the history of modem slavery. In both cases, that is, 
employers of labor would appear to have found the use of bodily compulsion 
(of various degrees of severity) economically advantageous for extracting 
labor services in a wide variety of market settings, and actively utilized this 
type of pressure until states, for a variety of political, social or moral reasons, 
intervened to force them to relinquish it. 
45) See volumes cited in note 28. 
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